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HEALTH MATRIX
The Journal of Law-Medicine
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
OF HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION:
NUREMBERG, HELSINKI,
AND BEYOND
George J. Annas t
SINCE WORLD WAR II there have been persistent efforts at
both the national and international level to develop rules to pro-
tect the rights and welfare of subjects of human experimentation.'
These efforts have focused primarily on codifying the rights of sub-
jects, and protecting their welfare by prior peer review of research
protocols. In recent years research regulations have been under at-
tack by politicians, drug companies, researchers, and advocacy
groups. In less than half a century, human experimentation has
been transformed from a suspect activity into a presumptively bene-
ficial activity. With this transformation, traditional distinctions be-
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tween experimentation and therapy, subject and patient, and
researcher and physician have become discouragingly blurred. Is-
sues of power, money, control, and fear of death have often been
more central than protection of the rights and welfare of research
subjects.
Special problems regarding rights and welfare of subjects have
been recognized in research involving vulnerable populations, in-
cluding pregnant women and fetuses, children, prisoners, and men-
tally-impaired people. But as premature death becomes a rarity in
developed countries, and death itself becomes more alien and
feared, the most vulnerable research subject, the one most consist-
ently transformed into an object (a mere means to an end), has be-
come the terminally ill patient. How did terminally ill patients
come to be so sought-after as research subjects? Can current inter-
national research guidelines protect their rights and welfare in re-
search trials? And if not, what additional steps are required to
protect the rights and welfare of this uniquely vulnerable
population?
A careful examination of the international research guidelines
set forth during the past fifty years leads to the conclusion that a
project that began as one to protect both the rights and welfare of
human research subjects is now concentrated on rights protection in
the developed nations, and on welfare protection in the developing
nations. In both settings the basic rationale for these two diverging
models is the same: desperation fueled by fear of death.2
The Nuremberg Code
The Nuremberg Code was formulated by United States judges
sitting in judgment of Nazi physician-experimenters following
2. The most quoted words in experimental medicine are not from any legal or ethical
canon, but from Hamlet: "Diseases desperate grown By desperate appliance are relieved, Or
not at all." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 4, sc. 2 (Edward Hubler ed., Signet Clas-
sic 1963). As with terminal illnesses such as cancer and AIDS, the best strategy regarding
the protection of research subjects is prevention. The King's "desperate diseases" speech
begins with his musings on Hamlet, as he says,
How dangerous is it that this man goes loose!
Yet must not we put the strong law on him:
He's loved of the distracted multitude,
Who like not in their judgment, but their eyes.
Id.
The same thing may be said about human experimentation. It is loved by the public, but
primarily because it is little understood, and its promise of "miracle" cures seems real. None-
theless, the dangers to human rights and welfare of research subjects are such that we must
"put the strong law on him" and develop and enforce reasonable research regulations.
[Vol. 2:119
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World War II. The Nazi experiments involved systematic and bar-
barous interventions in which death was the planned endpoint. The
subjects of these experiments were concentration camp prisoners,
mostly Jews, Gypsies and Slavs.3 The judges at Nuremberg viewed
human experimentation as suspect, and the Nuremberg Code itself
resulted from horrendous non-therapeutic, nonconsensual prison
research.
The Nuremberg Code, despite its inherent limitations, remains
the most authoritative legal and ethical document governing inter-
national research standards, and one of the premier human rights
documents in world history. The judges based the Nuremberg
Code on a natural law theory, deriving it from universal moral, eth-
ical, and legal concepts. The Code protects individual subjects first
by protecting their rights. Voluntary, informed, competent, and un-
derstanding consent is required by the first principle of the Code,
and principle 9 gives the subject the right to withdraw from the
experiment. The consent of the subject is necessary under the Nu-
remberg Code, although consent alone is not sufficient. The other
eight provisions of the Code are related to the welfare of subjects,
and must be satisfied before consent is even sought from the subject.
The subject cannot waive these provisions. The requirements of the
provisions include a valid research design to procure information
important for the good of society that cannot be obtained in other
ways; the avoidance of unnecessary physical and mental suffering
and injury; the absence of any a priori reason to believe that death
or disabling injury will occur; risks that never exceed benefits; and
the presence of a qualified researcher who is prepared to terminate
the experiment if it "is likely to result in the injury, disability, or
death of the experimental subject. ' 4
3. NAzi DocTORS, supra note 1.
4. The Nuremberg Code:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be
so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or
coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the
subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision.
This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the exper-
imental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the
experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and
hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may
possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each
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The Declaration(s) of Helsinki
Physician-researchers viewed the Nuremberg Code as confining
and inapplicable to their practices, because it was promulgated as a
human rights document by judges at a criminal trial, and because
the judges made no attempt to deal with clinical research on chil-
dren, patients, or mentally-impaired people. The World Medical
Association has consistently tried to marginalize the Code by devis-
ing The Declaration of Helsinki, a more permissive alternative doc-
ument, first promulgated in 1964, and amended three times since.
This document is subtitled "recommendations guiding doctors in
clinical research" and is just that, recommendations by physicians
to physicians. The Declaration's goal is to replace the human
rights-based agenda of the Nuremberg Code with a more lenient
medical ethics model that permits paternalism. U.S. researcher
Henry Beecher probably best expressed medicine's delight with the
Declaration of Helsinki's ascendancy when he said in 1970: "The
Nuremberg Code presents a rigid act of legalistic demands .... The
Declaration of Helsinki, on the other hand, presents a set of guides.
It is an ethical as opposed to a legalistic document and is thus more
individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and re-
sponsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, un-
procurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimenta-
tion and a knowledge of natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the
anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental
suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that
death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experi-
mental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanita-
rian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the
experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The high-
est degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those
who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the
experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the
experiment seems to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to termi-
nate the experiment at any stage, if he has probably cause to believe, in the exercise of the
good faith, superior skill, and careful judgment required of him, that a continuation of the
experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.
NAZI DocTORs, supra note 1, at 2.
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broadly useful than the one formulated at Nuremberg .... '
The core of the Declaration of Helsinki divides research into
therapeutic ("Medical Research Combined with Professional
Care") and non-therapeutic, eliminating the necessity for subject
consent in some cases.6 The major addition to the 1975 version
(mirroring developments in the United States and elsewhere) was
the encouragement of formal peer review of research protocols. For
example, a new "basic principle" provided that: "The design and
performance of each experimental procedure involving human sub-
jects should be clearly formulated in an experimental protocol
which should be transmitted to a specially appointed independent
committee for consideration, comment and guidance."
7
The movement to displace the consent requirement of the Nu-
remberg Code with prior peer review by a medical committee found
its greatest success in the 1975 Declaration. For example, the phy-
sician need not obtain the subject's informed consent to medical re-
search combined with professional care if he submits his reasons for
not obtaining consent to .the independent review committee.'
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences and
the World Health Organization
Scientific organizations were even more hostile to the Nurem-
berg Code than were the world's physicians. In 1967 the president
of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences
(CIOMS), for example, said that, "On the whole [the 1964 Declara-
tion of Helsinki] corrects what in the Nuremberg Rules was circum-
stantial, related to Nazi crimes, and places these Rules more
correctly in the context of generally accepted medical traditions." 9
Shortly thereafter, officials in the World Health Organization
5. Quoted in W. Refshauge, The Place for International Standards in Conducting Re-
search for Humans, 55 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 133-35 (Supp. 1977). See also the
comparison made by the world's leading liver transplant experimenter, Thomas Starzl: "The
Helsinki Declaration was shorter [sic] and easier to read." THOMAS STARZL, THE PUZZLE
PEOPLE: MEMOIRS OF A TRANSPLANT SURGEON 146 (1992).
6. NAzI DocroRs, supra note 1, at 335-36.
7. NAZI DocroRs, supra note 1, at 334.
Principle 1.2 of the 1989 revision of the Declaration (Helsinki IV) provides that the
experimental protocol "should be transmitted for consideration, comment and gui-
dance to a specifically appointed committee independent of the investigator and the
sponsor, provided that this independent committee is in conformity with the laws
and regulations of the country in which the research experiment is performed."
Id. at 159.
8. Sharon Perley, et al., The Nuremberg Code" An International Overview, in NAzi
DocroRs, supra note 1, at 159.
9. Refshauge, supra note 5, at 137.
1992]
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(WHO) were informed by officials at the National Institutes of
Health that WHO grant proposals would not be considered unless
they were approved by a WHO ethical review committee. WHO
had no such peer review committee, and set about to form one.
This was followed by a 1978 agreement between WHO and CIOMS
to "develop guidelines to assist developing countries in evolving
mechanisms that would ensure the observance of principles of medi-
cal ethics in biomedical research." 10 The result was an 1982 docu-
ment (currently under revision) designed to provide guidance to
developing countries.
Remarkably, the 1982 Guidelines contain the statement: "Both
the Nuremberg Code and the original Declaration of Helsinki of
1964 have been superseded by Helsinki II [1975]."' l Helsinki II did
supersede Helsinki I, but it could not, of course, supersede the judg-
ment at Nuremberg. The Nuremberg Code is based on interna-
tional natural law and ethics that even the prior positive law to the
contrary in Nazi Germany could not supersede. Thus the Nurem-
berg Code is the basis for international law and ethics in the area of
human experimentation, and lowering its standards can be accom-
plished neither by a vote of a group of researchers, nor by legal rule
in any individual country. In this regard, individual countries can
only legitimately add protections to the Nuremberg Code.
Nonetheless, the heart of the WHO/CIOMS project seems to
compromise the Nuremberg Code's requirement for consent of the
research subject as an integral part of international law and ethics.
Instead, the 1982 Guidelines rely heavily on "an independent im-
partial prospective review of all protocols." 12 For the first time in
an international document, special attention is given to children,
pregnant and nursing women, and mentally ill and mentally-im-
paired people. However, adults in developing countries, perhaps
unintentionally, are given the same uncomprehending status as chil-
dren and the mentally ill.13 For example, the rights of subjects are
subordinated to the view that researchers and community leaders
have of their welfare. Thus in developing countries it is suggested:
[W]here individual members of a community often do not have
10. Michael Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in NAzI DOCTORS,
supra note 1, at 135-160.
11. WHO/CIOMS, Proposed International Guidelinesfor Biomedical Research Involving
Human Subjects, CIOMS, Geneva (1982) at 23 [hereinafter Proposed Guidelines]. This lan-
guage was deleted from the August 1992 redraft of the revisions.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Carel B. Usselmuiden & Ruth R. Faden, Research and Informed Consent in Africa;
Another Look, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 830, 832 (1992).
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the necessary awareness of the implications of participation in an
experiment so as to adequately give informed consent, the Guide-
lines suggest that the decision on whether or not to participate
should be elicited through the intermediary of a trusted commu-
nity leader .... [T]he intermediary should make it clear... that
participation is entirely voluntary and that he may abstain or
withdraw from the experiment at any time. 14
On the other hand, the standards for "externally sponsored re-
search" done in developing countries are appropriately strict. Such
research must meet not only the ethical standards of the host coun-
try, but also the ethical standards of the initiating country.15 If this
standard (No. 28) is taken seriously, following the rights and wel-
fare requirements of the Nuremberg Code would be required in
most instances of United States and European-sponsored research
in developing countries. Nonetheless, CIOMS greatly confuses the
very concept of international law and ethics, seemingly encouraging
countries to find their lowest common denominator in subject
protection.
A 1992 draft revision of the 1982 Guidelines opens with a
recharacterization of human research project in developing coun-
tries. It states that there is a "positive duty to do good," and that
"Research is being seen as a good in itself, and as the discharge of
an ethical responsibility."16 This is, to my knowledge, the first time
research has been privileged over treatment, and virtually no expla-
nation is presented in the document for this radical assertion. If the
developed countries have ethical responsibilities to the developing
countries (and I believe they do), then the responsibilities of provid-
ing food, clothing, housing, education, and basic medical care must
all have a much higher priority than providing research protocols.
Thus, what seems at the center of this reconceptualization of re-
search is not the "discharge" of an "ethical obligation," but gaining
access to a population of research subjects for research that will
primarily benefit citizens in the developed world. 7
In summary, although the concept of vulnerable populations has
been recognized, there are no international research guidelines that
provide special rules or protections for the terminally ill, and there
14. Id. at 26-27. See also Perley et al, supra note 8, at 163. Substantially similar lan-
guage remains in the August 1992 redraft.
15. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 11 at 31-32.
16. This April 1992 draft language was dropped in the August 1992 redraft, and hope-
fully will not be resurrected in the final document.
17. See, eg., Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Vaccine to be Tested on Human Volunteers,
Bypassing Animal Trials, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1991, at A7.
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are no specific rules for research on terminal illnesses such as cancer
and AIDS. We have witnessed a general trend away from the Nu-
remberg Code toward considering the protection of either rights
(consent) or welfare (prior peer review) sufficient for human subject
protection. With regard to research on terminal illnesses such as
AIDS and cancer in the developed countries, this usually means
that the research will be seen as therapy, and patients (subjects)
who have the disease will be expected to protect themselves through
the mechanism of informed consent. In developing countries, on
the other hand, research on AIDS may be characterized as "com-
munity-based," and prior ethical review seen as sufficient protection
for the rights and welfare of community members. In both cases
the primary justification for research on terminal illnesses is the
same: desperation in the face of death.
Research on Dying Patients: AIDS and Cancer
Perhaps the primary reason that existing national and interna-
tional research guidelines have little practical relevance for individ-
uals with terminal illnesses is that the terminal diagnosis itself
determines both what researchers and physicians deem "reason-
able", and what the subjects (patients) themselves find acceptable -
even desirable. Many researchers themselves fear death, and believe
that terminally ill patients really can't be hurt (they are "going to
die anyway") and therefore have "nothing to lose." Prior peer re-
view of protocols under such circumstances becomes pro forma and
provides no meaningful protections for subjects. Likewise, termi-
nally ill patients who are told that medicine has "nothing to offer"
them have come to view experimental protocols as treatment.
Therefore, instead of being suspicious of experimentation, patients
may demand access to experimental interventions as their right.
Under such circumstances informed consent alone provides no
meaningful protection.
Psychiatrist Jay Katz has noted that when medicine seems im-
potent to fight the claims of nature, "all kinds of senseless interven-
tions are tried in an unconscious effort to cure the incurable
magically through a 'wonder drug,' a novel surgical procedure, or a
penetrating psychological interpretation."18 Although physicians
often justify such interventions as simply being responsive to patient
needs, "they may turn out to be a projection of their own needs
18. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 151 (1984).
[Vol. 2:119
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onto patients."19 Similarly, transplant surgeon Francis Moore has
observed of transplant experiments based on the "desperate reme-
dies" rationale: "There must be some likelihood of success before
the desperate remedy becomes more than a desperate search for an
opportunity to try a new procedure awaiting trial.' 20 AIDS activist
Rebecca Pringle Smith put it similarly, "Even if you have a supply
of compliant martyrs, trials must have some ethical validity."2 1
Susan Sontag has noted that cancer and AIDS have become
linked as perhaps the two most feared ways to die in the developed
world. In her words, "AIDS, like cancer, leads to a hard death...
The most terrifying illnesses are those perceived not just as lethal
but as dehumanizing, literally so."22 And although philosopher
Michel Foucault was not speaking of the medicalization of death by
cancer and AIDS, he could have been when he chronicled how the
power of government over life and death has shifted in the past two
centuries. "Now it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power
establishes its domination; death is power's limit, the moment that
escapes it .... ,23 In human experimentation on the terminally ill
we have Foucault's vision of public power played out in private:
researchers take charge of the bodies of the dying in an attempt to
take charge of the patient's lives and prevent their own personal
deaths, and death itself.2"
The Nazi doctors' chief defense at Nuremberg was that experi-
mentation was necessary to support the war effort. Now combat-
ting disease has itself become a "war," as we speak of a "war on
cancer" and a "war on AIDS." And in that war, patients, espe-
cially terminally ill patients, are conscripted as soldiers. As former
editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, Franz Ingelfinger,
put it: "[T]he thumb screws of coercion are most relentlessly ap-
plied" to "the most used and useful of all experimental subjects, the
patient with disease." 25 But as Sontag reminds us, war metaphors
19. Id.
20. Francis D. Moore, The Desperate Case CARE (Costs, Applicability, Research, Eth-
ics), 261 JAMA 1483, 1484 (1989).
21. Quoted in Joseph Palca, AIDS Drug Trials Enter New Age, 246 Sci. 19, 20 (1989).
22. SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR; AND, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 126
(1989).
23. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SExuALIrrY 138 (Robert Hurley trans.,
1990).
24. Id. at 143.
25. F.J. Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEw ENG. J. MED. 465,
466 (1972).
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are dangerous in disease because they encourage authoritarianism,
overmobilization, and stigmatization. In her words:
No, it is not desirable for medicine, any more than for war, to be
"total." Neither is the crisis created by AIDS a "total" any-
thing. We are not being invaded. The body is not a battlefield.
The ill are neither unavoidable casualties nor the enemy. We-
medicine, society-are not authorized to fight back by any means
whatever ....26
Cancer
In the early 1980s the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Behavioral Research attempted
to get agreement on categorizing Phase 1 drug studies with anti-
cancer agents. Are they research or therapy? Federal Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations state that Phase 1 studies
are intended to have no therapeutic content, but are to determine
"toxicity, metabolism, absorption, elimination, and other pharma-
cological action, preferred route of administration, and safe dosage
range."27 Nonetheless, National Cancer Institute (NCI) research-
ers insisted that Phase 1 cancer studies, using cancer patients as
subjects, should be described as therapeutic. The Assistant Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
wrote to Congress in 1981:
Notwithstanding the fact that some individuals within HHS may
not concur, the official position of the Department, including
NCI, NIH, and FDA, is to regard Phase 1 trials of anti-cancer
drugs as potentially therapeutic. The often small, but real possi-
bility of benefit must be weighed against the nearly 100 percent
probability of death if experimental therapy is not attempted for
the advanced cancer patients who participate in Phase 1
studies.28
The President's Commission never received a better answer to
its inquiry, and this answer is not helpful. In a sick person, virtu-
ally any intervention, even a placebo, can be described as "poten-
tially therapeutic," and once this misleading label is applied, the
nonbeneficial Phase 1 study is de facto eliminated and transformed
into "experimental therapy." Any distinction between experimen-
26. SONTAG, supra note 22, at 182-183.
27. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS, 65
(1981) [hereinafter President's Commission].
28. Id. (quoting letter from Edward N. Brandt, Jr., Assistant Sec. for Health, Dept. of
Health and Human Services, to the Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Health & Environment (Nov. 20, 1981, at 3-4)).
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tation and therapy is lost. Under these circumstances the Presi-
dent's Commission could only bow weakly to informed consent: "It
is important that patients who are asked to participate in tests of
new anti-cancer drugs not be misled about the likelihood (or re-
moteness) of any therapeutic benefit they might derive from such
participation."2 9
American oncologists use so many approved drugs for unap-
proved uses that it seems fair to conclude that for most cancers
there are no standard treatments, and sound scientific studies are
needed. A 1990 survey, for example, found that fully one-third of
all the drugs used on cancer patients are of unproven safety and
efficacy for the purpose for which they are given; and unapproved
use is even more prevalent for malignancies that have metastasized
than for earlier cancers.30 Unapproved chemotherapy for patients
being treated with palliative intent is twice the rate for curative in-
tent, indicating an appropriately higher degree of risk-taking for
quality of life enhancement. Oncologist Charles Moertel, comment-
ing on the study, noted that the major beneficiaries of such an ap-
proach to cancer treatment are the "appointment book of the
oncologist" and "the pharmaceutical companies and their stock-
holders."31 In short, business ethics seem to be supplanting medical
ethics. As to the argument that oncologists are just responding to
the demand of dying patients, Moertel responded: "This argument
abandons the scientific basis for medical practice and could just as
well be used to justify quackery. Also, one wonders how many pa-
tients with advanced pancreatic cancer, for example, would really
demand cytotoxic drugs if the sheer futility of such therapy was
honestly explained."32
If we accept patient demand as sufficient justification to mistreat
them, it is a short step to say that the patient should have the right
to demand to be killed by his physician. In fact, this very argument
was made in early 1992 in the New England Journal of Medicine,
where another oncologist noted that cancer chemotherapy, while it
can prolong life, often makes the patient's dying "unbearable." 33
29. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 43.
30. Thomas Laetz & George Silberman, Reimbursement Policies Constrain the Practice
of Oncology, 266 JAMA 2996, 2997 (1991).
31. Charles G. Moertel, Off-Label Drug Use for Cancer Therapy and National Health
Care Priorities, 266 JAMA 3031 (1991).
32. Id. See also Cornelius 0. Granai, Ovarian Cancer-Unrealistic Expectations, 327
NEW ENG. J. MED. 197 (1992).
33. Guy I. Benrubi, Euthanasia: The Need for Procedural Safeguards, 326 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 197 (1992).
1992]
HEALTH MATRIX
He went on to argue that, "since we physicians brought the patient
[subject] to the state she is in, we cannot abandon her by saying that
euthanasia violates the purpose of our profession."34 The use of
killing as "damage control" for a physician-created harm to pa-
tients is chilling. It is far better to avoid the harm than to use it to
justify killing. The quest to master terminal illness may, however,
make killing by physicians seem reasonable.35
The "desperate remedies" rationale used to justify experimenta-
tion on the terminally ill is seriously flawed. There are fates worse
than death, and many Americans have written living wills and
health care proxies to prevent their lives from being prolonged
under certain circumstances. 36 Likewise, the horrible and pro-
longed deaths of Barney Clark and William Schroder on the perma-
nent artificial heart insured the end of all further experiments with
the Jarvik 7.37 Although the device can obviously prolong life, it
cannot do so at an acceptable level of quality. The conclusion is
clear: dying patients are real people, not objects, who value quality
over quantity of life, and cannot be legally or ethically used simply
as a means to an end. Individuals do have a right to refuse any
treatment or experiment. But respecting patient autonomy does not
require that we accept demands for mistreatment, experimentation,
torture, or whatever the dying might want, anymore than we must
accede to demands for illegal (but effective) drugs like heroin and
LSD, unlicensed practitioners, or a physician-induced death.
Closely related to the difficulty of distinguishing research from
treatment is distinguishing the role of the researcher from the role
of the physician when these two conflicting roles are merged in one
person. For example, in a 1992 article on cancer and AIDS re-
search two prominent commentators seem to assume that "cancer
researchers" are properly seen as doctors providing "treatment" to
"patients. ' 38 Little attention has been paid to the researcher's in-
herent conflict of interest. It is unlikely that patients can ever draw
34. Id. at 198.
35. See, e.g., Physician-philosopher Leon Kass, who has argued "We do not yet under-
stand that the project for the mastery of nature and the conquest of death leads only to
dehumanization; that any attempt to gain the tree of life by means of the tree of knowledge
leads inevitably also to the hemlock .... Leon R. Kass, Suicide Made Easy: The Evil of
"Rational" Humaneness, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1991, at 19, 24.
36. See NANCY M.P. KING, MAKING SENSE OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES (1991).
37. George J. Annas, Death and the Magic Machine: Informed Consent to the Artificial
Heart, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 89 (1987).
38. David J. Rothman & Harold Edgar, Scientific Rigor and Medical Realities: Placebo
Trials in Cancer and AIDS Research, in AIDS: THE MAKING OF A CHRONIC DISEASE 194-
206 (E. Fee & D. Fox eds., 1992).
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the distinction between physician and researcher, because most sim-
ply do not believe that their physician would either knowingly do
something harmful to them, or would knowingly use them simply
as a means for their own ends. Cancer researchers, however, know
better. James F. Holland, for example, has said simply, "Patients
have to be subsidiaries of the trial... I'm not interested in holding
patients' hands. I'm interested in curing cancer... Every patient
becomes a piece of scientific data."39 As candid as Holland is, it
seems almost certain that his patients come to him for a cure, and
look upon him as their physician - not as simply a researcher. In
such a circumstance, the Helsinki Declaration's theoretical division
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research is meaningless.
Finally, we should emphasize that which has generally been
marginalized: most studies on the terminally ill, including cancer
and AIDS clinical trials, are funded by private drug companies that
have tremendous financial stakes in their success. Clinical investi-
gators may even "own equity interest in the company that produces
the product or may serve as paid consultants and scientific advis-
ers," roles that at least call their objectivity into question. 4 Medi-
cal ethics is being eroded by a new commercialism in medicine.
This fact has led most leading medical journals in the United States
to require financial disclosure prior to publication of research re-
sults. However, neither Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) nor in-
dividual subjects are routinely informed of the financial aspects of
proposed clinical trials, even though the finances often create major
potential conflicts of interest among the sponsor, the researcher,
and the patient-subject.
One need not search far for examples. In early February, 1992,
the stock of U.S. Bioscience lost $550 million in value in one day
after the FDA review panel refused to recommend approval of its
drug, Ethyl (a drug said to protect healthy cells from the toxic ef-
fects of cancer chemotherapy).4" One week later another United
States biotechnology company lost half of its value in one day when
a clinical trial of one of its cancer drugs was halted because of ad-
verse effects on the subjects.42 Financing may be the major change
39. Dena Kleiman, In Searchfor Cancer Cure, Patients Come Second, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 1986, at BI, B7.
40. Arnold Relman, Wat Market Values are Doing to Medicine, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 99, 103 (Mar. 1992).
41. Michael Waldholz, U.S. Bioscience Holders Are Latest to Get Costly Lesson, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at B6.
42. Floyd Norris, Drug's Test Pains MGI Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1992, at Cl;
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in clinical trials over the past two decades, and this change has not
been mirrored in research regulations. New research findings are
often reported first on the financial pages of newspapers, and only
later in the medical literature. It thus came as little surprise in
March 1992, when Dow Coming openly declared that its decision
to discontinue the manufacture of silicone breast implants was
made strictly on "the basis of business."43
AIDS
AIDS has always been perceived as the disease in which there
literally is no distinction between treatment and experimentation.
This is because there is no cure for AIDS. The disease primarily
strikes the young, leading to a death that is premature by virtually
any calculation, and existing treatments that can prolong life are far
from satisfactory. In addition, many people with the disease have
no access to health care, so the only way they can obtain medical
care is to enroll in an experimental drug trial. Thus, although theo-
retically wrong, ACT-UP's (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power)
political slogan, "A Drug Trial is Health Care Too," tragically is
factually correct in many U.S. settings. However, the slogan serves
to wrongly conflate experimentation with therapy, and to encourage
people with AIDS to seek out experimentation as treatment, and
physician-researchers to see AIDS patients as potential subjects
who have "nothing to lose."
As the Wall Street Journal editorialized in 1988, supporting a
loosening of FDA testing procedures for people with cancer,
Alzheimer's disease, and AIDS: "AIDS patients have driven home
to the U.S. medical and political establishment what enormous risks
human beings in death's grip will take to gain relief or respite."'
This editorial identified the problem and illustrated why regulation
is necessary. The FDA is not in the business of regulating "hope"
for "relief or respite" but of determining whether "relief or respite"
from particular drugs and devices is likely. Deregulation of human
experimentation cannot produce new drugs or treatments. Money
James P. Miller, MGlPharma Suffers 52% Fall in Stockprice, WALL ST. J. Feb. 11, 1992, at
B3.
43. Philip J. Hilts, As It Quits Implant Business, Maker Says Product is Safe, N.Y.
TIMES, March 20, 1992, at A12. See also Michael Waldholz, An Unapproved Drug for
Alzheimer's Gets a Big Marketing Push, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1992, at Al.
44. New Ideas for New Drugs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1988, at A16. See also Andrew
Pollack, Gene Therapy Gets the Go-Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1992, at DI; Mireya
Navarro, Into the Unknown: AIDS Patients Test Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1992, at 1, 29.
See also Rothman & Edgar, supra note 38 at 205.
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can, however, be made by pharmaceutical companies by exploiting
our fear of death and desperation. It seems fair to conclude that
virtually all of the drugs that have been developed for AIDS treat-
ment have been over-priced, and financially exploitative of those
with AIDS.45 Again, business ethics seem to be supplanting medi-
cal ethics.
Although the cover story is compassion, the movement to
loosen FDA's research rules should be seen for what it is: a political
strategy by a free market administration bent not on helping people
with AIDS, but on exploiting the AIDS epidemic to loosen drug
regulations and maximize profits for the pharmaceutical industry.46
For example, Jay Plager, counselor to the former Undersecretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services, asserted that one
purpose of early drug release regulations is to give "desperately ill
patients the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they
would rather take an experimental drug or die of the disease un-
treated."47 And former FDA Commissioner Frank Young said of
AIDS that, "there is such a degree of desperation, and people are
going to die, that I'm not going to be the Commissioner that robs
them of hope."' 48 The FDA must concentrate on using science to
identify beneficial treatments, not on using faith healing to promote
hope that an unproven drug might be beneficial. There is some evi-
dence that AIDS activists now recognize this. At the July 1992
International AIDS conference in Amsterdam, for example, ACT-
UP member Mark Harrington said he believed that regulatory re-
forms often "go for naught." In his words, "What is the point of
streamlining access and approval when the result is merely to re-
place AZT [with] mediocre, toxic, expensive" drugs.49 Harrington
urged others to follow his example and volunteer for experiments
involving basic science.5 0
Of course, it remains unethical to conduct a clinical trial in a
45. See, eg., Forcing Poverty on AIDS Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988 at A18 (edi-
torial); Maher, Pitiless Scourge: Separating Out the Hype from the Hope on AIDS, BARRON'S,
March 13, 1989, at 6, 22; Eric Savitz, No Magic Cure" The War on AIDS Produces Few
Gains, Except on Wall Street, BARRON's, Dec. 16, 1991, at 10.
46. See generally George J. Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope and Charity at the FDA: The
Politics of AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REv. 771 (1989).
47. Robert Pear, US. to Allow Use of Trial Drugs for AIDS and other Terminal Ills,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1987, at Al.
48. Phillip M. Boffey, FDA Will Allow AIDS Patients to Import Unapproved Medicines,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1988, at Al, A19.
49. Quoted in Lawrence K. Altman, At AIDS Talks, Reality Weighs Down Hope, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1992, at Al.
50. IM
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manner in which no reliable data can be generated. As Anthony
Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases, has properly noted, the primary goal of clinical trials is
"not to deliver therapy. It's to answer a scientific question so that
the drug can be available for everybody once you've established
safety and efficacy."51 On the other hand, community activists have
made some important points regarding AIDS, and some rules for
AIDS research in the United States are appropriately changing.
Three are of note: (1) Representatives of the gay rights and AIDS
communities are being asked to join governmental scientific advi-
sory panels which set research priorities; (2) people with AIDS are
being placed on local IRBs to evaluate community-based AIDS re-
search protocols; and (3) end points involving quality of life instead
of death are being explored in evaluating the results of AIDS drug
trials.5 2 Emphasis on quality of life measures seems especially rele-
vant in diseases like AIDS and cancer where brief increases in lon-
gevity may be possible only at the cost of severe suffering.53
Strategies such as promoting unproven AIDS drugs by press
conference and press release, and changing research rules for polit-
ical gain, foster false hope and financial exploitation. Terminally ill
AIDS and cancer patients can be harmed, misused, and exploited.
It has even been persuasively argued that we as a society have devel-
oped a "cure or kill" attitude that permits us to use the terminally
ill as "volunteers" for our experiments designed to banish death:
Our quest for a formula that will banish death seems to make it
acceptable to try questionable regimens on the aged and termi-
nally ill .... Those who insist on using the dying as experimental
subjects... see death as abnormal and dying patients as subhu-
man. We cast the terminally ill in modem rites of sacrifice, put-
ting patients of experiments ... through what one might see as
torture in the hope of postponing the inevitable.54
Of course, consent is no justification for the torture or inhumane
treatment of human beings. We must stop treating terminally ill
51. Joseph Palca, AIDS Drug Trials Enter New Age, 246 Sci. 19 (1989).
52. Carol Levine et al., Building a New Consensus: Ethical Principles and Policies for
Clinical Research on HI VAIDS, IRB, 1-22 (report which indicates an emerging consensus of
the formation and conduct of clinical trials for AIDS research) (Jan.-Apr., 1991), and see
Vanessa Merton, Community-Based AIDS Research, 14 EVALUATION REV. 502 (1990) (dis-
cusses the development and design of the Community Research Initiative of New York City,
an IRB that reviews community-based AIDS research).
53. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, UN-
CONVENTIONAL CANCER TREATMENTS 228 (1990).
54. Ralph Brauer, The Promise that Failed, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 28, 1988 sec. 6 (maga-
zine) at 34, 76.
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cancer and AIDS patients as subhuman by offering them questiona-
ble experiments in the guise of treatment. We cannot justify this
behavior on the basis of either their demand for it or our belief that
the ultimate good of mankind will be served by it. Researchers who
believe their subjects cannot be hurt by experimental interventions
should be disqualified from doing research on human subjects on
the basis that they cannot appropriately protect their subjects' wel-
fare with such a view. Likewise, subjects who believe they have
"nothing to lose" and are desperate because of their terminal illness
should also be disqualified as potential research subjects because
they are unable to provide voluntary, competent, informed or un-
derstanding consent to the experimental intervention with such a
view. It should be emphasized that these are proposed research
rules that would not necessarily apply to treatment in a doctor-pa-
tient relationship untainted by conflicts of interest.
What Should be Done Generally?
Action to protect research subjects in our new age of cancer and
AIDS seems reasonable on both the international and national
levels. On the international level we have already seen that the Nu-
remberg Code, the Helsinki Declaration, and WHO/CIOMS guide-
lines are almost universally seen as advisory and ethical only. They
have no legal status in most individual countries, and they provide
no mechanism for accountability or sanction of researchers who dis-
regard their precepts. Moreover, the content and structure of medi-
cal research has changed radically in the past decade, as we have
moved away from medical ethics, towards commerce and business
ethics. It would therefore seem reasonable at this time to seek more
definitive action or international research rules from the United Na-
tions. Although the United Nations never formally adopted the
Nuremberg Code, its consent principle did become an important
part of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which was promulgated in 1966 and adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in 1974.11 Article 7 of this
covenant states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no
one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scien-
tific experimentation. '56
55. Perley et al., supra note 8, at 153.
56. G.A. Res. 2200 A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/0316
(1966).
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Most physicians would, of course, be shocked at having any-
thing they do to patients considered "torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment." They would thus view the Covenant's provi-
sions much the same way they view the Nuremberg Code: as a
criminal law document not applicable to anything done in the doc-
tor-patient relationship. It should be noted, however, that in Nazi
Germany no distinction between torture and experimentation was
possible and many contemporary experiments produce "unbear-
able" suffering.
Because none of the existing conventions of the United Nations
deal in a detailed manner with human experimentation, M. Cheriff
Bassiouni has proposed that the United Nations adopt a specific
criminal Covenant on Human Experimentation:
Section 1. Acts of Unlawful Medical Experimentation
1.0 The crime of unlawful medical experimentation consists of
any physical and/or psychological alterations by means of surgi-
cal operations or injections, ingestion or inhalation of substances
inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official, or for which a
public official is responsible and to which the person subject to
such experiment does not grant consent as described in Section 2.
Section 2. Defense of Consent
2.1 For the purpose of this Article a person shall not be deemed
to have consented to medical experimentation unless he or she
has the capacity to consent and does so freely after being fully
informed of the nature of the experiment and its possible
consequences.
2.2 A person may withdraw his or her consent at any time and
shall be deemed to have done so if he or she is not kept fully
informed within a reasonable time of the progress of the experi-
ment and any development concerning its possible
consequences.57
Professor Bassiouni believes this draft Code was rejected be-
cause some member countries thought it might impinge upon the
practices of their pharmaceuticals industry.5" If true, this is a seri-
ous condemnation of the drug companies involved. It also makes
clear the need to include privately funded research in the Code as
well. The Code's purpose is to articulate human rights that all
members of the human community share by virtue of being
human.5 9 Human rights are more important than either medical or
business ethics, and are not a matter of "internal affairs." Because
57. M. Cheriff Bassiouni, et al., An Appraisal of Human Experimentation in Interna-
tional Law and Practice, 72 J. CRiM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1597-1666 (1981).
58. Perley, supra note 8 at 166.
59. Ruth Macklin, Universality of the Nuremberg Code, in NAzi DocToRs, supra note 1,
at 240-257.
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the United Nations is the only credible international body capable
of articulating an international code of conduct for human experi-
mentation, an international Covenant on Human Experimentation
based on the Nuremberg Code, covering all non-therapeutic re-
search, and all therapeutic research on competent individuals,
should be adopted. Additional provisions regarding children, the
mentally impaired, and the terminally ill [see infra.] should be
included.
An international tribunal for human experimentation should
also be established. Such a tribunal could be established to enforce
a United Nations-adopted Code, initially limited to civil sanctions,
and financed with a small percentage of the human research budget
of member states. Without an international tribunal with the au-
thority to judge and punish violators of international norms of
human experimentation, we are left where we began: international
norms of human experimentation are relegated to the domain of
ethics, and are ignored or subverted in that domain. This is because
without the possibility of judgment and punishment, there is no in-
ternational law worthy of the name, only international ethics.
An international tribunal will not be established overnight;
therefore, we should agree to voluntarily take some steps immedi-
ately. With regard to human rights, we should insist on informed
consent from all potential subjects capable of giving it. With regard
to human welfare, we must be much more insistent that
nonresearchers and nonphysicians make up a significant proportion
(at least half) of all ethical review committees. This step will not
solve the power problems inherent in expertise, but will help expose
the extent to which the agenda of the researcher/scientist diverges
from that of the nonexpert citizen. In addition, all research proto-
cols should be made public, and the financial arrangements and
sources must be made available to both review committees and sub-
jects to expose (and hopefully curtail) conflicts of interest. All
meetings of such review committees should be open to the public,
because openness helps to dilute the power of expertise and demo-
cratically enfranchise the public.
The Special Problems of Terminally Ill Research Subjects
Because the voluntary and understanding nature of consent of
the terminally ill subject is compromised, and because this popula-
tion is especially subject to exploitation by researchers who are
often unrealistically optimistic in their expectations and believe
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their subjects cannot be harmed, adoption of the following addi-
tional safeguards is suggested. The primary goals of these safe-
guards should be to protect the quality of life of conscious patients,
and to protect the unconscious from being used simply as objects
for the ends of others.
Proposed Regulations Governing Research on
Terminally Ill Patients
1. For the purpose of these regulations a "terminally ill pa-
tient" is one whose death is reasonably expected to occur
within six months even if currently accepted and available
medical treatment is used.
2. In addition to all other legal and ethical requirements for the
approval of a research protocol by national and local scien-
tific and ethical review boards (including IRBs), research in
which terminally ill patients participate as research subjects
shall be approved only if the review board specifically finds
that:
(a) The research, if it carries any risk, has the intent and
reasonable probability (based on scientific data) of im-
proving the health or well-being of the subject, or of
significantly increasing the subject's length of life with-
out significantly decreasing its quality;
(b) There is no a priori reason to believe that the research
intervention will significantly decrease the subject's
quality of life because of suffering, pain, or indignity at-
tributable to the research; and,
(c) Written informed consent will be required of all re-
search participants over the age of sixteen in research
involving any risk, and such consent may be solicited
only by a physician acting as a patient rights advocate
who is appointed by the review committee, is independ-
ent of the researcher, and whose duty it is to fully and
objectively inform the potential subject of all reasonably
foreseeable risks and benefits inherent in the research
protocol. The patient rights advocate will also be em-
powered to monitor the actual research itself.
(3) The vote on and basis for each of the findings in subpart (2)
shall be set forth in writing by the review board, and be
available to all potential subjects and the public.
(4) All research protocols (including the financial arrangements
between the sponsor and the researcher) involving termi-
nally ill subject shall be available to the public, and the
meetings of the scientific and ethical review boards on these
protocols shall be open to the public.
The major features of this proposal are worth emphasizing. The
first is that so-called non-therapeutic research may not be per-
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formed on terminally ill patients at all unless there is no risk to the
patient. Nor may "potentially," or "hopefully," or "possibly" ther-
apeutic research be performed - the research must have "the in-
tent and reasonable probability (based on scientific data) of
improving the health or well-being of the subject .... " The fact
that there is no treatment for the condition does not make any inter-
vention "therapeutic" or even "probably" therapeutic. Phase 1 can-
cer drug research, for example, may not be performed on terminally
ill subjects under these guidelines because there is no reasonable
probability that it will benefit the subjects. Second, for subjects over
the age of sixteen, only the subjects themselves are permitted to give
consent for any research that involves any risk. Unless the condi-
tion is unique to children, no experimentation should be done on
children until it has been demonstrated to meet the "reasonable
probability" standard in adults. Proxy consent is acceptable only
for no risk research (such as observation and monitoring studies,
blood sampling, and research involving comatose patients). Third,
the researcher is disqualified from obtaining the subject's consent.
This task must be performed by an independent physician acting as
a patient rights advocate, and whose primary obligation is to pro-
tect the rights and welfare of the potential research subject. Finally,
the protocols, their financing, votes on them, and meetings concern-
ing them, shall be open to the public.
These steps should help to protect both the rights and welfare of
the terminally ill. Changes in codes and procedures alone, however,
will not be sufficient to clarify societal goals for research and the
practice of medicine, to define the meaning of progress, or to deline-
ate the appropriate content of the practice of medicine. Resolving
these central questions requires a recognition on the part of both
society and medical practitioners that immortality is not a reason-
able goal for medicine or humanity,' that there are fates worse
than death, and that quality of life is more important than quantity
of life.61
We can harm the terminally ill by treating them as objects with
nothing to lose. They are our most vulnerable population, and need
much more protection then they are currently afforded. It will take
reality-based care for the dying, rather than fantasy-based experi-
ments on the dying, to reclaim medicine's commitment in The Dec-
60. See, eg. Hans Jonas, The Burden and Blessing of Mortality, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 34, 39.
61. See, eg., DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL
PROGRESS (1990).
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laration of Geneva: "The health of my patient will be my first
consideration." 62
62. World Medical Association, Declaration at Geneva, 1948.
